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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND BULK TELEPHONE
METADATA: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT CASE LAW
STEVEN G. STRANSKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 2015, the President signed into law the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline
Over Monitoring Act of 2015,1 which is also known as the “USA FREEDOM
Act.”2 The law effectively ended the U.S. government’s ability to utilize
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT3 to collect telephone metadata4 in
bulk from telecommunication service providers for foreign intelligence
purposes.5 On the same day that he signed the USA FREEDOM Act into law,
the President issued a statement providing that the law “will strengthen civil
liberty safeguards and provide greater public confidence in [the U.S.

* LL.M., National Security Law, Georgetown University Law School; J.D., the University of
Akron, C. Blake McDowell Law Center; B.A., The Ohio State University. The author serves as
an Attorney-Advisory at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The author would like to
thank the editors and staff on the Saint Louis University Public Law Review for assisting in the
publication of this article. The views and misjudgments contained herein belong entirely to the
author.
1. Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015). The Bill passed in the House of
Representatives by a vote of 388-88 and in the Senate by a vote of 67-32. See H.R. 2048, 114th
Congress (2015), available at www.congress.gov.
2. Judge Mosman described the law’s title as “another example of the tail of a catchy
nickname wagging the dog of a Rube Goldberg official title.” In re Application, Docket No. BR
15-75, at *1, n.1 (FISC Ct. June 29, 2015), redacted opinion available at https://www.eff.org/
files/2015/07/01/fisa_court_opinion_-_june_29_2015.pdf.
3. P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified 50 U.S.C. § 1861).
4. The term “metadata” refers to a set of data or information that describes and gives
information about other data, and does not include the content of communications. NAT’L. INFO.
SHARING ORG., UNDERSTANDING METADATA 1 (2004), http://www.niso.org/publications/press/
UnderstandingMetadata.pdf. (Understanding Metadata is a revision and expansion of Metadata
Made Simpler: a guide for libraries published by NISO Press in 2001.)
5. See OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, JOINT STATEMENT BY THE
[DEP’T OF JUSTICE] AND THE [OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE] ON THE
DECLASSIFICATION OF THE RESUMPTION OF COLLECTION UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA
PATRIOT ACT (June 30, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint–statement–department–justice
–and–office–director–national–intelligence–declassificati–0 (noting that “[t]he USA FREEDOM
Act of 2015 banned bulk collection under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act . . .”).
3
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government’s telephone metadata programs,] including by prohibiting bulk
collection through the use of Section 215 . . . and by providing the American
people with additional transparency measures.”6
In addition to its distinct statutory amendments limiting the government’s
ability to collect telephone metadata, the USA FREEDOM ACT will
significantly impact on-going litigation concerning the constitutionality of the
U.S. government’s bulk telephone metadata collection program. Specifically,
after certain provisions of the USA FREEDOM ACT go into effect after 180
days of its enactment,7 the courts will most likely dismiss such litigation on the
grounds that that the U.S. government does not have the statutory authority to
continue to collect telephone metadata in bulk and the cases will therefore be
viewed as moot.8 According to one commentator, a case pending in the D.C.
District Court regarding the government’s collection program “will be moot in
November when the USA Freedom Act goes into effect.”9 In fact, even prior to
the law’s passage, “[l]egal scholars” were indicating that “at least three of six
major lawsuits against the program likely would be doomed” if the USA
FREEDOM Act becomes law, which was troubling to some activists who were
relying on these cases to “brand” the government’s activities as
unconstitutional.10 According to Professor Douglas Laycock, “[i]t’s pretty
inconceivable that the Supreme Court would hear one of these cases after a
statute makes them moot.”11
Prior to the USA FREEDOM Act becoming law, however, judges from
across the federal judicial system examined whether the U.S. government’s
collection of bulk telephone metadata was restricted or otherwise impacted by

6. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Statement by the President on
the USA FREEDOM Act (June 2, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/
02/statement-president-usa-freedom-act.
7. See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things,
No. BR 15-75, at *1 (holding that the USA FREEDOM Act “deliberately carved out a 180-day
period following the date of enactment” in which the U.S. government was authorized to continue
to use FISA to collect telephone metadata in bulk).
8. See generally Steven Nelson, Freedom Act May Kill Lawsuits That Seek Major Privacy
Ruling, US NEWS & WORLD REP., (May 13, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/arti
cles/2015/05/13/freedom–act–may–kill–lawsuits–that–seek–major–privacy–ruling.
9. Benjamin Wittes, Standing Confusion in Obama v. Klayman, LAWFARE (Aug. 31, 2015,
5:33 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/standing–confusion–obama–v–klayman.
10. Nelson, supra note 8.
11. Steven Nelson, Freedom Act’s Advance Threatens NSA Court Cases, US NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Nov. 14, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/14/free
dom-acts-advance-threatens-nsa-court-cases (quoting Douglas Laycock, Professor, University of
Virginia Law School). But see, David Greene, Appeals Court Sends Smith v. Obama NSA
Lawsuit Back to the Trial Court, Electronic Frontier Foundation, (Mar. 24, 2016) (noting that
certain litigation regarding the U.S. government’s metadata collection program may continue to
resolve claims for “money damages”).
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the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and this article consolidates
those opinions.12 In analyzing this constitutional issue, the courts primarily
focused on the extent to which the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v.
Maryland13 was applicable to the U.S. government’s metadata collection
efforts and whether the concurring opinions in its more recent decision of U.S.
v. Jones14 provided a new framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment
matters.15 However, given the unlikelihood that the courts will continue to
accommodate lawsuits regarding the government’s (soon to be) obsolete
metadata collection program, the case law consolidated herein may provide the
only judicial guidance regarding the applicability of the Fourth Amendment
and Smith and Jones with regard to bulk telephone metadata.16 Thus, to the
extent the U.S. government is seeking to establish a new national security
program involving the bulk collection of telephone metadata, whether through
a separate statutory scheme or through Presidential directive, the cases
described infra provide the most recent direction and guidance on these Fourth
Amendment principles.17 In other words, although there is a plethora of
academic discussions related to the constitutionality of the bulk telephone
metadata program, the cases described herein are significant because they
represent the only judicial scrutiny on this very narrow topic.18

12. See United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 18, 2013); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Smith v. Obama, 24 F.Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 2014); In re
Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). Several courts and
commentators have argued that collection of bulk telephone metadata is not authorized by Section
215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT; however, because this article focuses on the judicial decisions
regarding the constitutionality of the program, it will only infrequently discuss these statutory
arguments.
13. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
14. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
15. EDWARD C. LIU, ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R43459, OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO NSA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES 5–6 (2015) (stating that the resolution of this
constitutional issue “turns, in large part, on the applicability of the 1979 case Smith v. Maryland
to the bulk collection program and the persuasiveness of more recent Supreme Court discussions
about the effect of new technologies and prolonged government surveillance on the privacy
interests of Americans.”).
16. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Jones, 132 U.S. at 945. See also Part IV infra.
17. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Jones, 132 U.S. at 945.
18. For opposing viewpoints from academia related to the constitutionality of the bulk data
collection program, compare Randy E. Barnett, Commentary, The NSA’s Surveillance Is
Unconstitutional, THE WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2013, 6:44 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100
014, with Orin S. Kerr, Metadata, the NSA, and the Fourth Amendment: A Constitutional
Analysis of Collecting and Querying Call Records Databases, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July
17, 2013, 3:54 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/07/17/metadata-the-nsa-and-the-fourth-amendmenta-constitutional-analysis-of-collecting-and-querying-call-records-databases/.
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This article is segregated into five parts. Part II provides a brief overview
of the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata collection program. Part III
examines the scope of the Fourth Amendment and emphasizes certain judicial
precedent and principles that are discussed by the case law described in Part
IV; Part III also describes the executive branch’s interpretation and application
of this Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV, in turn, discusses the recent
case law examining whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the U.S.
collection of telephone metadata. As will be described in greater detail below,
four separate district courts have ruled directly on this issue and in three of the
cases the courts rejected the challenges to the government’s collection
activities and held that the Supreme Court’s precedent in Smith supports the
conclusion that the U.S. government’s collection of telephone metadata in bulk
is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.19 This issue has been discussed (to
varying degrees) by two circuit courts, one of which provided, in dicta, that the
collection of such data raises “serious” constitutional concerns.20 On the other
hand, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)21 has routinely held
that this collection activity is consistent with the Fourth Amendment and, in
reaching its conclusions, the FISC has addressed the opposing arguments and
conclusions reached by the aforementioned district and circuit courts.22
II. BACKGROUND: SECTION 215 AND BULK TELEPHONE METADATA
On August 9, 2013, the Obama Administration drafted a “White Paper”
that provided, inter alia, an overview of its bulk telephone metadata collection
program it conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT.23

19. See United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 18, 2013); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v.
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Smith v. Obama, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho
2014); In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
20. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d. Cir. 2015); Obama v. Klayman, No. 14-5004
(D.C. Cir. 2015).
21. See The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (FISA), Pub. 95–
511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801–1885c). The FISC is an eleven-judge court that
may approve requests from the Attorney General for warrants to authorize the U.S. government to
undertake certain surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Id.
22. See Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518; see also Klayman, 957 F.
Supp. 2d; Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d; Smith, 24 F. Supp. 3d; In re Application, No. BR 13–109,
2013 WL 5741573; Clapper, 785 F.3d; Klayman, No. 14-5004.
23. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT (Aug. 9, 2013) [hereinafter, “White Paper”],
https://www.eff.org/document/administration–white–paper–section–215–patriot–act. See
generally Ellen Nakashima & Robert Barnes, Obama Administration Asserts Broad Surveillance
Powers, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2013, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/oba
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Therein, the Administration states that “[d]etecting threats by exploiting
terrorist communications has been, and continues to be, one of the critical
tools” in the U.S. government’s efforts to combat terrorism, and “[i]t is
imperative that [the U.S. government] have the capability to rapidly identify
any terrorist threat inside the United States.”24 “One important method that the
Government has developed to accomplish this task,” according to the White
Paper, “is analysis of metadata associated with telephone calls within, to, or
from the United States.”25 Not surprisingly, the Director of National
Intelligence provided similar comments during congressional testimony as he
noted that Section 215 provides an “important tool” in detecting and
preventing terrorist attacks.26
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT authorizes the FISC to issue a
court order for the “production of any tangible things (including books,
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain
foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to
protect against international terrorism,” so long as the investigation of a United
States person is not “conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the
first amendment to the Constitution.”27 The White Paper states that pursuant to
Section 215, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would obtain FISC
orders directing telecommunication service providers to give the National
Security Agency (NSA) their business records that contain certain
telecommunications metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed and the date,
time, and duration of a call.28 The court orders generated by the FISC do not
authorize the NSA to “listen to” or “record” any telephone calls as part of this
program.29 Because the telecommunication entities “are directed to supply
virtually all of their calling records to the NSA, the [FISC’s] orders result in

ma–administration–asserts–broad–surveillance–powers/2013/08/09/ff429504–0134–11e3–96a8–
d3b921c0924a_story.html.
24. White Paper, supra note 23, at 2.
25. White Paper, supra note 23, at 2.
26. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (Jan.
29, 2014) (statement for the record from James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence).
27. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1), (c).
28. White Paper, supra note 23, at 3 (noting that FISC production orders “do not allow the
Government to collect the content of any telephone call, or the names, addresses, or financial
information of any party to a call” or “cell phone locational information” (emphasis in original)).
But see THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 27 (Jan. 23, 2014) (“Some
information obtained by the NSA under Section 215 could nevertheless provide a general
indication of a caller’s geographic location. For instance, the area code and prefix of a landline
telephone number can indicate the general area from which a call is sent.”).
29. White Paper, supra note 23, at 1.
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the production of call detail records for a large volume of telephone
communications.”30 Approximately every ninety days, the FBI files a new
application with the FISC requesting that telecommunication service providers
be ordered to continue providing this metadata to the NSA for another ninety
days.31
The NSA retains and queries this bulk metadata for counterterrorism
purposes, which the White Paper described as follows:
Under the FISC orders authorizing the collection, authorized queries may only
begin with an “identifier,” such as a telephone number, that is associated with
one of the foreign terrorist organizations that was previously identified to and
approved by the Court. An identifier used to commence a query of the data is
referred to as a “seed.” Specifically, under Court-approved rules applicable to
the program, there must be a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that a seed
identifier used to query the data for foreign intelligence purposes is associated
with a particular foreign terrorist organization . . .
Information responsive to an authorized query could include, among other
things, telephone numbers that have been in contact with the terroristassociated number used to query the data, plus the dates, times, and durations
of the calls. Under the FISC’s order, the NSA may also obtain information
concerning second and third-tier contacts of the identifier (also referred to as
“hops”). The first “hop” refers to the set of numbers directly in contact with
the seed identifier. The second “hop” refers to the set of numbers found to be
in direct contact with the first “hop” numbers, and the third “hop” refers to the
set of numbers found to be in direct contact with the second “hop” numbers.
Following the trail in this fashion allows focused inquiries on numbers of
interest, thus potentially revealing a contact at the second or third “hop” from
the seed telephone number that connects to a different terrorist-associated
telephone number already known to the analyst. Thus, the order allows the
NSA to retrieve information as many as three “hops” from the initial identifier.
Even so, under this process, only a tiny fraction of the bulk telephony metadata
records stored at NSA are authorized to be seen by an NSA intelligence
32
analyst, and only under carefully controlled circumstances.

30. THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 28, at 22.
31. THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 28, at 27. When the
FISC approves an application for an order requesting metadata, it issues a “primary order”
outlining the scope of data that each telecommunication entity must provide the NSA and the
restrictions on how the government can query and disseminate said data. THE PRIVACY AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 28, at 23. Separately, the FISC produces a
“secondary order” addressed to the telecommunication entity directing it to comply with those
terms and conditions. THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 28, at
23.
32. White Paper, supra note 23, at 3–4. See also Exec. Order No. 12333, 40 Fed. Reg.
59,941, 59,949 (Dec. 4, 1981) (describing the limitations on the ability for Intelligence
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In addition to how the NSA queries this metadata, the White Paper
discusses how this data was retained and disseminated.33 Specifically, it
provides that the “[r]esults of authorized queries are stored and are available
only to those analysts trained in the restrictions on the handling and
dissemination of the metadata” and “[q]uery results” are further analyzed “only
for valid foreign intelligence purposes.”34 The NSA may “provide leads” to the
FBI or other Intelligence Community elements; however, for U.S. persons, the
NSA may only provide such leads for counterterrorism investigations.35 In
turn, “[i]f the FBI investigates a telephone number or other identifier tipped to
it through this program, [it] must rely on publicly available information, other
available intelligence, or other legal processes,” such as a court order
subpoena, “in order to identify the subscribers of any of the numbers that are
retrieved.”36
The White Paper identifies procedural safeguards related to the retention,
querying, and dissemination of this metadata.37 For example, it provides that
“[t]echnical controls preclude NSA analysts from seeing any metadata unless it
is the result of a query using an approved identifier,” and “when the seed
identifier is reasonably believed to be used by a U.S. person, the suspicion of
an association with a particular foreign terrorist organization cannot be based
solely on activities protected by the First Amendment.”38 In addition, it
provides that NSA analysts must “apply the minimization and dissemination
requirements and procedures specifically set out in the FISC’s orders before
query results, in any form, [can be] disseminated outside of the NSA.”39 Unless
the metadata is identified thought the aforementioned query process, the NSA

Community elements, such as the NSA, to collect, retain, and disseminate information concerning
“U.S. persons,” as the term is defined therein).
33. See White Paper, supra note 23.
34. White Paper, supra note 23, at 4.
35. White Paper, supra note 23, at 4.
36. White Paper, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that if, through further investigation, the FBI
“develop[ed] probable cause to believe that a number in the United States was being used by an
agent of a foreign terrorist organization,” it could then “apply to the FISC for an order . . . to
authorize interception of the contents of future communications to and from that telephone
number.”).
37. See White Paper, supra note 23.
38. White Paper, supra note 23, at 3. According to the White Paper, the “reasonable,
articulable suspicion” standard “protects against the indiscriminate querying of the collected
data.” White Paper, supra note 23, at 3. However, “[a]s used in other contexts, [reasonable,
articulable suspicion] is a less stringent standard than the “probable cause” standard that is
required to be satisfied for criminal search warrants or traditional electronic surveillance under
FISA.” LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 3.
39. White Paper, supra note 23, at 3; see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (defining the term
“minimization procedures”).
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must delete the information “no later than five years after the agency receives
[it].”40
The White Paper notes that “although a large amount of metadata is
consolidated and preserved by the Government, the vast majority of that
information is never seen by any person” and that “[o]nly information
responsive to the limited queries that are authorized for counterterrorism
purposes is extracted and reviewed by analysts.”41 This sentiment is echoed by
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), which provided the following:
“[g]enerally, the telephony metadata program has operated by placing few
limits on the government’s ability to collect and retain large amounts of
domestic and international telephone records while imposing more stringent
restrictions on the government’s capacity to search or make further use of the
collected metadata.”42 “These restrictions,” according to the CRS “are not
explicitly required by the statutory text of Section 215,” but “[i]nstead . . . are
delineated as part of the orders the FISC issues pursuant to Section 215.”43
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Recent case law analyzing the government’s ability to collect and retain
bulk telephone metadata for foreign intelligence purposes has primarily
focused on the scope of the Fourth Amendment and the third party doctrine, as
enumerated in Smith.44 Accordingly, this section provides background
information on the Fourth Amendment’s legal framework and how it has been
interpreted by the Executive Branch. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides,
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
45
persons or things to be seized.”

The Fourth Amendment’s applicability to a particular circumstance depends on
whether “the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a
‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by

40. THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 28, at 25. See also
White Paper, supra note 23, at 3.
41. White Paper, supra note 23, at 4. According to the Administration, “[a]lthough the
number of unique identifiers has varied substantially over the years, in 2012, fewer than 300 met
the “reasonable, articulable suspicion” standard and were used as seeds to query the data after
meeting the standard.” White Paper, supra note 23, at 4.
42. LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 3 (emphasis in original).
43. LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 3.
44. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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government action.”46 In other words, the Fourth Amendment protection
applies only if (1) a person has an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in
the place searched, and (2) that expectation, viewed objectively, is justified
under the circumstances.47 In determining whether an individual may have a
constitutionally protected expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court has
routinely relied upon the third party doctrine, which refers to “[t]he principle
that one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information that one has
voluntarily disclosed to one or more third parties.”48
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court analyzed the third party doctrine
in the context of metadata disclosed to telephone companies during the course
of routine telephone calls, and, as noted above, all the cases discussed infra
focus on the extent to which Smith is applicable in the bulk telephone metadata
context.49 The Smith case focused on whether the government could request,
without a warrant, that a telephone company install a pen register to record the
numbers dialed from the telephone at a criminal suspect’s residence and use
the information derived therefrom in a criminal prosecution.50 The Court ruled
that the numerical information conveyed to the phone company during a
routine telephone call, such as the telephone number dialed, is not protected by
the Fourth Amendment because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in
such information.51 The Supreme Court stated that “[t]elephone users . . .
typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone
company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information;
and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety
of legitimate business purposes.”52
Accordingly, the Court found that telephone subscribers do not “harbor
any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”53 The
Supreme Court held that “even if petitioner did harbor some subjective
expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this
46. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
47. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
48. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
443 (1976) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent “the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information
is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed”).
49. See LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 5–6 .
50. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
51. Id. at 739–46. According to the Court, the “petitioner in all probability entertained no
actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his
expectation was not ‘legitimate.’ The installation and use of a pen register, consequently, was not
a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.” Id. at 745–46.
52. Id. at 743; see generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 561, 577-78 (2009).
53. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
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expectation is not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”54
The Court reiterated that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”55
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones needs to be
discussed herein because of the manner in which it has been incorporated or
rejected by the court decisions described infra.56 In Jones, law enforcement
officers attached, without a warrant, a Global Positioning System (GPS) device
to the defendant’s vehicle and tracked his location for twenty-eight days.57 The
defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence derived from this
surveillance on the grounds that the government’s actions violated protections
afforded to him under the Fourth Amendment.58 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address this issue and Justice Scalia, writing on behalf of the
majority, concluded that the law enforcement officers’ conduct constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment because the information at issue was
obtained by means of a physical intrusion on the defendant’s vehicle, which is
a constitutionally-protected area.59
Two concurring opinions in Jones, however, raised concerns with relying
upon precedent for analyzing reasonable expectations of privacy in the context
of the government’s ability to collect information on a person through the use
of advanced technological systems.60 Specifically, in her concurring opinion,
Justice Sotomayor questioned the relevancy of Smith in analyzing the
constitutionality of bulk data collections, and provided the following passage,
which garnered special attention in the cases described below:
“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which

54. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
55. Id. at 743–44; see also United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding
“data about [a telephone] ‘call origination, length, and time of call’ . . . is nothing more than pen
register and trap and trace data, [in which] there is no Fourth Amendment ‘expectation of
privacy’”) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44); see also Gilday v. Dubois, 124 F.3d 277, 296
n.27 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44).
56. See LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 5–6.
57. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948; see generally Robert Barnes, Supreme Court
Limits Police Use of GPS Tracking, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/supreme-court-warrants-needed-in-gps-tracking/2012/01/23/gIQAx7qGLQ_
story.html.
58. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
59. Id. at 949, 953. According to Justice Scalia, “[i]t is important to be clear about what
occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id. at
949.
60. Id. at 955.
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people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in
the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers
that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the
e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online
retailers . . . I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
61
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”

According to Professor Miriam Baer, “in fewer than ten paragraphs, Justice
Sotomayor questions and reframes two of the oldest and most criticized
doctrines in modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,” but “[c]ommendably,
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion stops short of creating the drastic change in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”62
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito, provided the following guidance
with regard to the novel issues associated with using modern, non-intrusive
surveillance techniques: “the best that [the Court] can do in this case is to
apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS
tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable
person would not have anticipated.”63 “Under this approach,” according to
Justice Alito, “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on
public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has
recognized as reasonable.”64 However, Justice Alito concluded by noting that
“the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy” and that “[f]or such offenses, society’s
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and
indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every
single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”65 It is
important to note that in contrast to Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, Justice
Alito’s concurring opinion does not reference the third party doctrine, the
Smith case, or government efforts related to the collection or retention of bulk
telephone metadata.66
A.

Executive Branch Interpretation and Application

Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, the primary responsibility of the Attorney
General “has been to advise the President and the heads of the executive

61. Id. at 955–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
62. Miriam H. Baer, Secrecy, Intimacy, and Workable Rules: Justice Sotomayor Stakes Out
the Middle Ground in United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. F. 393 (2014).
63. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 957.
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departments on legal matters,”67 and the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) has
been “delegated virtually all of the Attorney General’s contemporary opinion
writing.”68 The OLC itself has stated that it is responsible for providing
“authoritative legal advice to the President and all the Executive Branch
agencies,”69 and the courts have recognized that OLC-issued opinions are,
except under certain circumstances, “binding as a matter of law” on the
Executive Branch.70 The OLC has previously put forth formal guidance
regarding how the Fourth Amendment impacts (1) the government’s collection
of telephone metadata and (2) intelligence community collection activities, in
general.71 In order to better understand the government’s position in the
judicial case described infra, these two issues will be described here.
First, regarding the collection of telephone metadata, the OLC has
consistently held that, in accordance with Smith, an individual does not possess
a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in information
provided to telephone companies during the course of routine telephone calls.72
The OLC relied on this precedent and legal reasoning when interpreting
whether an individual has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
in bulk metadata provided to third parties.73 Specifically, the OLC has stated,

67. Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary
Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 337 (1993); see 28 U.S.C § 511 (“The Attorney General
shall give his advice and opinion on questions of law when required by the President.”); id. §511
(“The head of an executive department may require the opinion of the Attorney General on
questions of law arising in the administration of his department.”).
68. Kmiec, supra note 67, at 337; see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (enumerating the functions of
the OLC).
69. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, About the Office, www.justice.
gov/olc.
70. See Public Citizen v. Burke, 655 F. Supp. 318, 321–22 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that with
limited exception, “an Attorney General’s opinion is binding as a matter of law on those who
request it until withdrawn by the Attorney General or overruled by the courts.”).
71. See e.g. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Legal Issues Relating to the Testing,
Use, and Deployment of an Intrusion–Detection System (EINSTEIN 2.0) to Protect Unclassified
Computer Networks in the Executive Branch, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2009).
72. See e.g. id, at 6 (providing that, in accordance with Smith, there is “no legitimate
expectation of privacy in dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information transmitted to
telephone companies”); Transmission by a Wireless Carrier of Information Regarding Cellular
Phone User’s Physical Location to Public Safety Organizations, 20 Op. O.L.C. 315, 319 n.17
(1996) (noting that the “Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a person has no expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,” such as in telephone numbers
dialed”); Fourth Amendment Implication of Military Use of Forward Looking Infrared Radars
Technology for Civilian Law Enforcement, 16 Op. O.L.C. 41, 45 n.17 (1992) (affirming that
Smith held “the installation and use of a pen register to record telephone numbers . . . was not a
search, although the pen register revealed to police telephone numbers that [the defendant] dialed
within the privacy of his own home”).
73. See e.g. Bradbury, supra note 71, at 12.
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“[a]s for metadata collection . . . we conclude that under the Supreme Court’s
decision in [Smith], the interception of the routing information for both
telephone calls and e-mails does not implicate any Fourth Amendment
interests.”74
These historical OLC memoranda are consistent with the current
Administration’s interpretation of this issue, which was summarized in the
White Paper as follows:
“Although the telephony metadata obtained through Section 215’[s] [bulk
telephone metadata collection program] includes, in addition to the numbers
dialed, the length and time of the calls and other similar dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information, under the reasoning adopted by the
Supreme Court in Smith, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such
information, which is routinely collected by telecommunications service
providers for billing and fraud detection purposes. Under longstanding
Supreme Court precedent, this conclusion holds even if there is an
understanding that the third party will treat the information as confidential.
75
Nothing in [Jones] changed that understanding of the Fourth Amendment.”

The Obama Administration has argued that the “scope” of the U.S.
government’s telephone metadata collection program “does not alter the
conclusion that the collection of telephony metadata under a Section 215 court
order is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”76 “Collection of telephony
metadata in bulk from telecommunications service providers under the
program,” according to the Administration, “does not involve searching the
property of persons making telephone calls. And the volume of records does
not convert that activity into a search.”77
Second, the OLC has repeatedly held that even if U.S. intelligence
community activities impact an individual’s constitutionally protected right to
privacy, the Fourth Amendment does not always require the government to
obtain a warrant in order to effectuate these efforts.78 For instance, in 2006, the
74. Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT ATT’Y GEN., REVIEW
LEGALITY OF THE STELLAR WIND PROGRAM 101 (May 6, 2004) [hereinafter,
“STELLAR WIND”], redacted memorandum www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attach
ments/2014/09/19/may_6_2004_goldsmith_opinion.pdf.
75. White Paper, supra note 23, at 20.
76. White Paper, supra note 23, at 20.
77. White Paper, supra note 23, at 20.
78. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the
President, 30 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 8 (2006) [hereinafter Legal Authorities] (“[T]he President has
inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless searches and surveillance within the
United States for foreign intelligence purposes.”); see also STELLAR WIND, supra note 74, at
37–43 (arguing that even in peacetime, absent congressional action, the President has inherent
constitutional authority, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, to order warrantless foreign
intelligence surveillance).
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OLC provided the following assessment related to the Fourth Amendment and
U.S. intelligence community activities:
“The touchstone for review of government action under the Fourth
Amendment is whether the search is “reasonable” . . . [A]ll of the federal
courts of appeals to have addressed the issue have affirmed the President’s
inherent constitutional authority to collect foreign intelligence without a
warrant . . . . Properly understood, foreign intelligence collection in general . . .
fit[s] within the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the mere fact that no warrant is secured
prior to the surveillance at issue in the NSA activities does not suffice to render
79
the activities unreasonable.”

The OLC has stated that in determining whether a government activity is
reasonable within the context of a Fourth Amendment analysis, one must
undertake a “general balancing approach, ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.’”80 This OLC interpretation has been reinforced by the current
Administration.81
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND TELEPHONE METADATA: RECENT CASE
LAW
In recent years, four district courts, one circuit court, and several FISCs
have addressed – to varying degrees – whether the U.S. government’s
collection and retention of bulk telephone metadata for foreign intelligence
purposes is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.82 This portion of the
memorandum describes the legal analysis, reasoning, and conclusions reached
by these separate courts on this discrete issue.

79. Legal Authorities, supra note 78, at 33; see also STELLAR WIND, supra note 74, at
37–43 (providing a substantially similar legal analysis).
80. Legal Authorities, supra note 78, at 33.
81. See White Paper, supra note 23, at 21.
82. See generally United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); see
also ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Smith v. Obama, 24
F.Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 2014); see also In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring
the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISA Ct.
Aug. 29, 2013); see also In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-158 (FISA Ct. October 11, 2013), www.aclu.
org/files/assets/2013.10.11_fisa_court_memorandum.pdf; see also In re Application of F.B.I. for
an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01 (FISA Ct. March 20,
2014), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1148929/opinion-and-order-in-case.pdf; see
also In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
No. BR 15-75 (FISC Ct. June 29, 2015).
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District Court Decisions

As noted, four separate district courts have ruled directly on the
aforementioned issue related to the bulk collection of telephone metadata and
in three of the cases the courts have indicated that the third party doctrine, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Smith, is applicable to the U.S.
government’s collection activities therein.83 In contrast, only one district court
opinion distinguished bulk collection of telephone metadata from the Court’s
decision in Smith, and indicated that such information most likely is protected
by the Fourth Amendment.84
1. United States v. Moalin
In U.S. v. Moalin,85 the U.S. government alleged that the defendants
conspired to and provided certain types of material support to terrorists and
terrorist organizations in violation of law.86 Prior to trial, the defendants sought
to suppress wiretap evidence obtained pursuant to a FISC warrant on the
grounds that the collection of such information violated, inter alia, the Fourth
Amendment.87 The court denied the defendants’ request to suppress such
evidence, and, after seventeen days of trial and deliberations, the jury found the
defendants guilty on all counts alleged in the U.S. government’s indictment.88
After the trial, the news media reported on the existence of several classified
surveillance programs conducted by the U.S. government, which included the
Section 215 program and other programs used to gather information on the
defendants.89 Consequently, the defendants filed a motion for a new trial on the
basis that the Fourth Amendment protects the telephone metadata provided to
their telecommunication providers, and the U.S. government’s collection of
such information in bulk violated their constitutional rights.90 Thus, in
reviewing this motion, the court addressed whether the defendants had any
reasonable expectation of privacy in certain telephone metadata.91 At the time
the motion for a new trial was filed with the court, one commentator opined,

83. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
84. See Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *1.
87. Id. at *1, *5.
88. Id. at 2–3; see also Press Release, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Three Somali
Immigrants Sentenced for Providing Support to Foreign Terrorists (Nov. 18, 2013).
89. Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518 at *3.
90. Id. at *5.
91. Id.
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“if it proves successful, . . . [it will] break the NSA’s dragnet phone
surveillance program.”92
Judge Miller, writing the opinion of the district court, began his Fourth
Amendment analysis by reiterating the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith that
“someone who uses a telephone has ‘voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and exposed that information to its
equipment in the ordinary course of business,’ and therefore has ‘assumed the
risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.’”93 The
Judge then noted that the defendants were requesting the court to ignore
precedent, including the Smith decision, and to “blaze a new path and adopt the
approach to the concept of privacy set forth by Justice Sotomayor in her
concurrence in [Jones].”94
Judge Miller provided, “Justice Sotomayor stated that the recent rise of the
digital era of cell phones, internet, and email communications may ultimately
require a reevaluation of ‘expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties.’”95 The “defendants extrapolate from this dicta,”
according to Judge Miller, “that the court should recognize that defendant
Moalin had a reasonable expectation of privacy cognizable under the Fourth
Amendment that the Government would not collect either individual or
aggregated metadata.”96 However, the district court rejected this argument and
provided the following:
“[P]en register-like devices predate the internet era by about 150 years and are
not a product of the so-called digital revolution-the basis for the concerns
articulated by Justice Sotomayor. Second, and more importantly, the Supreme
Court specifically and unequivocally held in Smith that retrieval of data from a
pen register by the Government without a search warrant is not a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Because individuals voluntarily convey
numerical information to the telephone company to complete a telephone call,
one cannot possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone
97
number dialed (as opposed to the content of the conversation).”

92. Sean Vitka, The Dragnet’s Day in Court, SLATE (Sept. 30, 2013, 2:25 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/09/basaaly_moalin_s_defense_team_
takes_on_ass_nsa_telephone_surveillance.html.
93. Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518 at *6 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 744).
94. Id. at *7.
95. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)).
96. Id.
97. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 8 (noting that the
Moalin court rejected the Defendant’s motion for a new trial, and in doing so, “observ[ed] that the
use of pen registers, which the Supreme Court upheld in Smith, have pre-dated the digital
revolution by about 150 years, negating the argument that the Jones concurrences’ discussion of
new technologies compelled a different result”).
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Judge Miller stated that “when defendant Moalin used his telephone to
communicate with third parties, whether in Somalia or the United States, he
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers dialed.98
The calls were routed through the communications company and its switching
equipment in the ordinary course of business.”99 According to the Judge
Miller, “[w]hile defendant Moalin may have had some degree of a subjective
expectation of privacy, that expectation is not ‘one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.’”100 Judge Miller concluded his opinion by
referencing similar holdings promulgated by the FISC,101 which will be
discussed in more detail infra.
2. Klayman v. Obama
In Klayman v. Obama,102 subscribers to certain telecommunications and
Internet services brought actions against the U.S. government and private
service providers alleging, inter alia, that the government’s bulk collection of
telephone metadata violated the Fourth Amendment.103 The subscribers moved
for a preliminary injunction to prevent the U.S. government from continuing to
engage in the bulk collection and querying of telephone record metadata, and
to require the government to destroy any such metadata in its possession.104 In
analyzing whether to grant the preliminary injunction, the district court
undertook a legal analysis wherein it considered, inter alia, whether the
plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, including
(germane to the issue herein) whether they are likely to succeed on their Fourth
Amendment claim.105
Ultimately, based on the following rational, the district court found that
Smith was not binding precedent in the context of the Klayman case and that
“bulk telephony metadata collection and analysis almost certainly does violate
a reasonable expectation of privacy.”106 First, Judge Leon, writing on behalf of
district court, distinguished the type of bulk data collection undertaken by the
government in its case from the facts in Smith on the basis that the records used
by the government in Smith were considered “short-term” and “forwardlooking” and the government’s collection efforts in Klayman involved the
98. Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518 at *7.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12, (1978)).
101. Id. at *8 (“The FISC has similarly determined that individuals like Defendant Moalin
cannot successfully assert a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim to telephony metadata.”).
102. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded to Obama
v. Klayman, No. 14–5004 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
103. Id. at 7.
104. Id. at 7–8.
105. Id. at 25–43.
106. Id. at 32.
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“creation and maintenance of a historical database containing five years’ worth
of data.”107 Second, Judge Leon found that the “relationship between the police
and the phone company in Smith is nothing compared to the relationship that
has apparently evolved over the last seven years between the Government and
telecom companies,” which itself raises Fourth Amendment concerns because
of the “formalized policy under which the service provider collects information
for law enforcement purposes.”108
Third, Judge Leon referred to the U.S. government’s technological
capability to store and analyze bulk telephone metadata as “almost-Orwellian”
and noted that it is “unlike anything” previously reviewed by the courts.109
Thereafter, Judge Leon quoted Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones and
stated that this technology is “‘cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously,’ thereby
‘evad[ing] the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement
practices: limited police . . . resources and community hostility.”110 Finally,
Judge Leon focused on the fact that “[c]ell phones have also morphed into
multi-purpose devices,”111 and argued that “most importantly, not only is the
Government's ability to collect, store, and analyze phone data greater now than
it was in 1979, but the nature and quantity of the information contained in
people’s telephony metadata is much greater, as well.”112 Thereafter, Judge
Leon again quoted Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones and held
that “[the] rapid and monumental shift towards a cell phone-centric culture
means that the metadata from each person’s phone ‘reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,’

107. Id.
108. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32–33 (emphasis in original). Judge Leon stated, “[i]t’s one
thing to say that people expect phone companies to occasionally provide information to law
enforcement; it is quite another to suggest that our citizens expect all phone companies to operate
what is effectively a joint intelligence-gathering operation with the Government.” Id. at 33; see
also, Paul Rosenzweig, The Lynchpin of the Meta-Data Opinion, LAWFARE (Dec. 16, 2013)
(“Judge Leon dismisses Smith v. Maryland (a case that the FISC considered controlling) on the
ground that . . . well . . . it’s old.”).
109. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
110. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)).
111. Id. at 34. But see Orin S. Kerr, Preliminary Thoughts on Judge Leon’s Opinion, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Dec. 16, 2013, 6:45 PM) (emphasis in original) http://volokh.com/2013/12/16/pre
liminary–thoughts–judge–leons–opinion/ (arguing that it does not matter “that today’s phones are
combined in a single device with other functions” because the government’s collection program
is “not collecting information about the use of those other functions” and “[i]t is only collecting
the same information that was collected in Smith v. Maryland: Information about numbers dialed
using the device’s telephone functionality and when the call was made”).
112. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (emphasis in original).
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that could not have been gleaned from a data collection in 1979.”113 “[T]hese
trends,” according to the Judge, “have resulted in a greater expectation of
privacy and a recognition that society views that expectation as reasonable.”114
Judge Leon concluded his Fourth Amendment analysis with the following:
“Plaintiffs have alleged that they engage in conduct that exhibits a subjective
expectation of privacy in the bulk, five-year historical record of their telephony
metadata, and I have no reason to question the genuineness of those subjective
beliefs. The more difficult question, however, is whether their expectation of
privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable
and justifiable . . . [T]he question that I will ultimately have to answer when I
reach the merits of this case someday is whether people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy that is violated when the Government, without any basis
whatsoever to suspect them of any wrongdoing, collects and stores for five
years their telephony metadata for purposes of subjecting it to high-tech
querying and analysis without any case-by-case judicial approval. For the
many reasons set forth above, it is significantly likely that on that day, I will
115
answer that question in plaintiffs’ favor.”

According to one commentator, Judge Leon made a “powerful case” for
distinguishing the U.S. government’s bulk telephone metadata program from
its collection activities as issue in Smith.116
After determining that the U.S. government’s collection of telephone
metadata in bulk is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
Judge Leon turned next to whether the search was “reasonable.”117 He began
his analysis by stating the well-established principle that warrantless searches
by the government are per se unreasonable in the context of the Fourth
Amendment.118 Judge Leon recognized, but did not endorse, the U.S.
government’s argument that the “special needs” exception applies to the facts
presented, and held that in order to reach a decision on the matter he must
“balance” the privacy expectations of the plaintiff against the interests of the
U.S. government “to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or
some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.”119
113. Id. at 36 (quoting Jones 132 S. Ct. at 955) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see generally
Adam Serwer, How Sotomayor Undermined Obama’s NSA, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 23, 2013, 5:43
PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how–sotomayor–undermined–obamas–nsa.
114. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (emphasis in original).
115. Id. at 37.
116. Benjamin Wittes, Thoughts on Judge Leon’s Section 215 Opinion, LAWFARE (Dec. 17,
2013, 10:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts–judge–leons–section–215–opinion.
117. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 29–31.
118. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 37–38; see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997)
(“To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”).
119. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–34,
(2002)); see also Legal Authorities, supra note 78, at 33 (discussing the “special needs” exception
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Specifically, Judge Leon analyzed (1) the nature of the privacy interest
allegedly compromised by the U.S. government’s search, (2) the character of
the intrusion imposed on the plaintiffs by the government, and (3) the nature
and immediacy of the U.S. government’s concerns and the efficacy of the
government’s collection activities in meeting them.120
In analyzing the first two criteria, Judge Leon held that because of the
reasons described above, the plaintiffs have a “significant expectation of
privacy in an aggregated collection of their telephony metadata covering the
last five years, and the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Program significantly
intrudes on that expectation.”121 In examining the last criteria, Judge Leon
stated that “[g]iven the . . . utter lack of evidence that a terrorist attack has ever
been prevented because searching the NSA database was faster than other
investigative tactics—I have serious doubts about the efficacy of the metadata
collection program . . . ”122 Judge Leon concluded by noting that the “plaintiffs
have a substantial likelihood of showing that their privacy interests outweigh
the Government’s interest in collecting and analyzing bulk telephony metadata
and therefore the NSA’s bulk collection program is indeed an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment.”123 According to Professor Orin Kerr,
Judge Leon’s opinion in Klayman, “[g]ives opponents of the NSA program
more fuel to add to the fire, but its legal impact is quite limited because the
case now just goes to the court of appeals,”124 which was vacated and
remanded by the appellate court primarily because the plaintiffs failed to
establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on the issue of
standing.125

to the Fourth Amendment in the context of U.S intelligence community activities); see also
STELLAR WIND, supra note 74, at 33.
120. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
121. Id. at 39.
122. Id. at 40–41; but see THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Remarks by
President Obama and German Chancellor Merkel in Joint Press Conference (June 19, 2013,
12:46 p.m.), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obamaand-german-chancellor-merkel-joint-press-confere (noting that because of the U.S. government’s
surveillance programs, “at least 50 threats . . . have been averted”).
123. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
124. Ellen Nakashima & Ann E. Marimow, Judge: NSA’s Collecting of Phone Records is
Probably Unconstitutional, Wash. Post (Dec. 16, 2013) (quoting Orin S. Kerr), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/national/judge–nsas–collecting–of–phone–records–is–likely–unconstitutional/20
13/12/16/6e098eda–6688–11e3–a0b9–249bbb34602c_story.html.
125. Klayman, 800 F. 3d at 561-64.
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3. American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper
In American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper,126 the plaintiffs brought a
legal action seeking a declaratory judgment that the NSA’s bulk telephony
metadata collection program violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment.127
The plaintiffs moved for a permanent injunction enjoining the U.S.
government from continuing the collection, and, in response, the government
moved to dismiss the case.128
In analyzing the Fourth Amendment issue, Judge Pauley III, writing on
behalf of the district court, reaffirmed the “bedrock holding” articulated in
Smith that an “individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information provided to third parties.”129 Judge Pauley III then continued his
opinion to address and then dismiss the plaintiff’s argument that protections
enumerated within the Fourth Amendment apply to bulk telephone metadata
provided to and maintained by telecommunication service providers.130
According to Judge Pauley III, “the business records created by Verizon are
not ‘plaintiffs’ call records,’” as argued by the Plaintiffs, but are records
created and maintained by the telecommunications provider, and “[u]nder the
Constitution, that distinction is critical because when a person voluntarily
conveys information to a third party, he forfeits his right to privacy in the
information.”131 Additionally, “the Government’s subsequent querying of the
telephony metadata does not implicate the Fourth Amendment—anymore than
a law enforcement officer’s query of the FBI’s fingerprint or DNA databases to
identify someone.”132 “The collection of breathtaking amounts of information
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment,” according to Judge Pauley III, “does
not transform that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search.”133

126. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) rev’d on other grounds; ACLU
v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d. Cir. 2015) (vacating the district court’s rulings on statutory ground,
and only briefly discussed the Constitutional issues ruled on by the district court).
127. Id. at 730; see generally Adam Liptak and Michael S. Schmidt, Judge Upholds N.S.A.’s
Bulk Collection of Data on Calls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/
28/us/nsa–phone–surveillance–is–lawful–federal–judge–rules.html; see generally Bob Van Voris,
NSA Call Data Sweep Ruled Legal as Court Conflict Brews, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Dec. 28,
2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013–12–27/nsa–call–data–pro
gram–ruled–lawful–by–u–s–judge.
128. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 730.
129. Id. at 749 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
130. Id. at 749–52.
131. Id. at 751.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 752; see also White Paper, supra note 23, at 20 (“Collection of telephony metadata
in bulk from telecommunications service providers under the program does not involve searching
the property of persons making telephone calls. And the volume of records does not convert that
activity into a search.”).
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In additional, Judge Pauley III critiqued the plaintiff’s reliance on Judge
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones in formulating their argument:
The ACLU’s reliance on the concurring opinions in Jones is misplaced. In
Jones, the police attached a GPS tracking device to the undercarriage of a
vehicle without a warrant and tracked the vehicle’s location for the next four
weeks. The majority held that a “search” occurred because by placing the GPS
device on the vehicle, “[t]he Government physically occupied private property
for the purpose of obtaining information . . . [S]uch a physical intrusion would
have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when it was adopted.” In two separate concurring opinions, five justices
appeared to be grappling with how the Fourth Amendment applies to
technological advances.
But the Supreme Court did not overrule Smith. And the Supreme Court has
instructed lower courts not to predict whether it would overrule a precedent
even if its reasoning has been supplanted by later cases . . . Clear precedent
applies because Smith held that a subscriber has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in telephony metadata created by third parties. Inferior courts are
134
bound by that precedent.

Thereafter, Judge Pauley III addressed Judge Leon’s opinion in
Klayman,135 which, according to the Judge, focused on the “the ubiquity of
cellular telephones” and how the relationships between telephone users and
telecommunication providers “have evolved since Smith.”136 However,
according to Judge Pauley III, this relationship “has not changed and is just as
frustrating.”137 Further, the Judge found that it is immaterial to the Fourth
Amendment that telephones are more “versatile now than when Smith was
decided,” because the underlying issue is still focused on the noncommunications content aspect of telephone calls.138 “The fact that there are
more calls placed,” said Judge Pauley III, “does not undermine the Supreme

134. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (internal citations omitted); see Peter Margulies, Judge
Pauley’s Opinion in Clapper: Reset Button for Bulk Collection Debate? LAWFARE (Dec. 28,
2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/judge–pauleys–opinion–clapper–reset–button–
bulk–collection–debate (stating that in Judge Pauley III’s view, the warrant requirement, as
articulated in Jones, for “planting a GPS device” on a car “does not discredit the third-party
doctrine” and “Jones . . . merely requires a heightened standard for the physical, more
comprehensive intrusion connoted by the surveillance in that case, which has none of the
elements of consent that drive the third-party doctrine”).
135. Liptak & Schmidt, supra note 127 (quoting Orin S. Kerr). According to Professor Kerr,
the opinions written by Judge Pauley III and Judge Leon are “the exact opposite . . . in every way,
substantively and rhetorically.” Id.
136. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Court’s finding that a person has no subjective expectation of privacy in
telephony metadata.”139
Last, Judge Pauley III quoted the Klayman decision when concluding his
own Fourth Amendment analysis: “[i]mportantly, ‘what metadata is has not
changed over time,’ and ‘[a]s in Smith, the types of information at issue in this
case are relatively limited: [tele]phone numbers dialed, date, time, and the
like.”140 According to Judge Pauley III, “[b]ecause Smith controls, the NSA’s
bulk telephony metadata collection program does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.”141 Professor Margulies stated that judge Pauley’s opinion “is a
welcome corrective to the anti-metadata clamor triggered by Judge Leon’s
Klayman opinion” and it “deflates the overblown arguments made by metadata
critics on the program’s efficacy, the quality of judicial and congressional
oversight, and the continued vitality of the Supreme Court’s precedent in Smith
v. Maryland.”142 However, as will be discussed infra, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned this decision, but did so based upon statutory grounds
and only addressed the Fourth Amendment issues in dicta.143
4. Smith v. Obama
Similar to the facts discussed in the previous two cases, in Smith v.
Obama144 the plaintiff brought an action against the U.S. government wherein
she sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting the NSA from collecting her
cellular telephone records and call data.145 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged
that the collection activity violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure.146 In response to the plaintiff’s motion
(and as could be expected), the U.S. government sought to dismiss the case.147
Chief Judge Winmill, writing for the district court, analyzed the
government’s activity within the context of the Fourth Amendment and first
reiterated the Smith decision and found that the plaintiff “has no expectation of
139. Id. See also Kerr, supra note 111 (arguing that the change in cell phone use and
technology does not alter the underlying conclusions in Smith).
140. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (quoting Klayman, 957 F.Supp.2d at 35) (emphasis in
original).
141. Id.
142. Margulies, supra note 134.
143. Smith v. Obama, 24 F.Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 2014).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1006–07.
146. Id.
147. Id. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Another Federal Judge Rules on Legality of NSA
Surveillance, WASH. POST (June 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh–con
spiracy/wp/2014/06/03/another–federal–judge–rules–on–legality–of–nsa–surveillance/; Steven
Nelson, Nurse’s NSA Lawsuit Gains Firepower, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 16, 2014),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/16/idaho–nurses–nsa–lawsuit–gains–firepower–
from–aclu–eff.
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privacy in the telephone numbers that she dials” and “[a] person using the
telephone ‘voluntarily convey[s] numerical information to the telephone
company’ and ‘assume[s] the risk that the company [will] reveal to police the
numbers he dialed.’”148 Thereafter, Chief Judge Winmill posed a hypothetical
question to himself: “the data collected by the NSA reaches into [plaintiff’s]
personal information [and] the NSA’s collection of the time and duration of
phone calls is revealing: Would most citizens want to keep private the fact that
they called someone at one in the morning and talked for an hour or two?”149
The Chief Judge went a step further and indicated that the “intrusion” the
Supreme Court addressed within Smith – law enforcement surveillance of
telephone numbers dialed from a criminal suspect for two days – represents a
“looming gulf” with the intrusion in the current case,150 which he described as
the U.S. government collecting and storing the telephone metadata of U.S.
citizens for five years151 that results in a “vast trove of data” within the U.S.
government’s possession.152 Yet, in response to the concerns he raised, the
Chief Judge noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently
found that telephone and email metadata and other similar information does
not receive Fourth Amendment protection153 and that two other district courts –
Moalin and Clapper – have applied Smith to find that the U.S. government’s
bulk telephone metadata program does not violate the Fourth Amendment.154
Next, the Chief Judge addressed Judge Leon’s contrary holding in
Klayman, which he described as a “thoughtful and well-written decision.”155
Chief Judge Winmill provided the following summary of the Klayman
decision:
[Judge Leon] distinguished Smith by finding that the scope and duration of the
NSA’s collection is far beyond the individual pen register at issue in Smith. Of
critical importance to Judge Leon was that Smith could never have anticipated
the ubiquity of cell-phones and the fact that “people in 2013 have an entirely
different relationship with phones than they did thirty-four years ago.” As he
eloquently observes, “[r]ecords that once would have revealed a few scattered
tiles of information about a person now reveal an entire mosaic—a vibrant and

148. Smith, 24 F.Supp. 3d at 1007 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)).
149. Id. at 1007–08.
150. Id. at 1008.
151. Id. at 1006–07.
152. Id. at 1007.
153. Id. at 1008 (citing United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2009)); United
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Golden Valley Elec.
Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012).
154. Smith, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1005; see generally Devlin Barrett, Idaho Judge Asks Supreme
Court to End NSA’s Phone Surveillance, WALL ST. J (June 3, 2014, 5:07 PM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/idaho-judge-suggests-supreme-court-end-nsa-phone-surveillance-1401824175.
155. Smith, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1009.
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constantly updating picture of the person’s life.” Ultimately, he held that the
plaintiffs had a likelihood of success on their Fourth Amendment claim, and he
156
enjoined the NSA from collecting their telephone records . . . .

The Chief Judge believes that “Judge Leon’s decision should serve as a
template for a Supreme Court opinion.”157 Yet, regardless of his admiration for
Judge Leon’s opinion in Klayman, Chief Judge Winmill found that “Smith was
not overruled, and it continues . . . to bind this Court” and thus “constrains
[him] from joining Klayman.”158 Accordingly, the district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.159 Professor Kerr summarized the opinion as
follows: “Judge Winmill concludes that the NSA program complies with the
Fourth Amendment as a matter of precedent, but . . . expresses the view that
the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court should change their precedent so as to
deem the NSA program unconstitutional.”160
B.

The Circuit Court Decisions

There have been only two circuit courts – the Second Circuit and the
District of Columbia Circuit – that have addressed or otherwise discussed
whether the U.S. government’s collection of bulk telephone metadata for
foreign intelligence purposes is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.161 The
Second Circuit’s decision primarily focused on statutory matters, but addressed
the aforementioned issue in dicta.162 On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit
opinion focused on whether the plaintiffs have standing and the thresholds for
a preliminary injunction; the D.C. Circuit only mentioned the Fourth
Amendment issue in passing.163 Accordingly, only the Second Circuit opinion
will be discussed herein.
1. The Second Circuit: American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper
As noted above, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the U.S.
government’s collection of bulk telephone metadata in the context of the
Fourth Amendment, [and stated in dicta] that the aforementioned government

156. Id. (internal citations omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1010.
159. Id. at 1010.
160. Kerr, supra note 147.
161. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d. 787, 825 (2nd Cir. 2015); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013)561–64 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
162. See Clapper, 785 F.3d. at 825.
163. Klayman, 800 F.3d at 561–64 (“The preliminary injunction entered by the district court
is hereby vacated and the case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.”).
See generally Wittes, supra note 9 (discussing the Klayman ruling on the issue of standing).
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activity raises “serious” constitutional concerns.164 Specifically, on September
2, 2014, the Second Circuit reviewed the appeal from the plaintiffs–appellants
wherein they argued that Judge Pauley III, in the decision discussed supra,
erroneously dismissed their case.165 At the circuit court, the plaintiffs alleged
that the bulk telephone metadata collection program conducted by the U.S.
government was not authorized by statute and violated the Fourth
Amendment.166 Judge Lynch, writing on behalf of the Second Circuit, based
his decision solely on the former: “[b]ecause we find that the [NSA] program
exceeds the scope of what Congress has authorized, we vacate the decision
below dismissing the complaint without reaching appellants’ constitutional
arguments.”167
However, although Judge Lynch did not use the Fourth Amendment as a
basis for his ruling, he did discuss Fourth Amendment concerns at length in
dicta.168 Judge Lynch framed the competing constitutional arguments between
the parties as follows:
The government argues, and the district court held, that [the third party]
doctrine requires rejection of appellants’ claim that the acquisition of telephone
metadata (as opposed to the contents of communications) violates the Fourth
Amendment, or even implicates its protections at all. Appellants respond that
modern technology requires re-visitation of the underpinnings of the third169
party records doctrine as applied to telephone metadata.

According to Judge Lynch, this “touches an issue on which the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence is in some turmoil.”170 Thereafter, he reiterated the
holding in Smith related to the third patty doctrine and telephone metadata, but
provided the following observation:
Metadata today, as applied to individual telephone subscribers, particularly
with relation to mobile phone services and when collected on an ongoing basis
164. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 808; see generally Pete Williams, Federal Appeals Court Says NSA
Phone Records Program Illegal, NBC NEWS (May 7, 2015, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/20
15/05/07/federal-appeals-court-says-nsa-phone-records-program-illegal-dj.html; Mark Rodgers,
2nd Circuit Finds NSA’s Bulk Metadata Program Not Authorized By Patriot Act, LEXISNEXIS
(May 7, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/technology/b/cyber-riskprivacy/archive/2015/05/07/second-circuit-finds-nsa-s-bulk-metadata-program-not-authorizedby-patriot-act.aspx.
165. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 792. But see Peter Margulies, Clapper and the Costs of
Overlooking Use Restrictions, LAWFARE (May 14, 2015, 2:55 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/clapper-and-costs-overlooking-use-restrictions (discussing some of the “flaws” in the
Second Circuit’s decision).
166. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 792, 799.
167. Id. at 792.
168. Id. at 822–25.
169. Id. at 822.
170. Id. at 821; Rodgers, supra note 164 (briefly discussing the constitutional issues raised in
the Second Circuit’s decision in Clapper).
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with respect to all of an individual’s calls (and not merely, as in traditional
criminal investigations, for a limited period connected to the investigation of a
particular crime), permit something akin to the 24–hour surveillance that
worried some of the Court in Jones. Moreover, the bulk collection of data as to
essentially the entire population of the United States, something inconceivable
before the advent of high-speed computers, permits the development of a
government database with a potential for invasions of privacy unimaginable in
the past. Thus, appellants argue, the program cannot simply be sustained on the
reasoning that permits the government to obtain, for a limited period of time as
applied to persons suspected of wrongdoing, a simple record of the phone
171
numbers contained in their service providers’ billing records.

Judge Lynch concluded his opinion by noting that the court does not need
to resolve the “weighty constitutional issues” present in this case, but that
“[t]he seriousness of the constitutional concerns” described in the court’s
opinion “has some bearing on what we hold today, and on the consequences of
that holding.”172
C. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Decisions
As noted above, the FISC has routinely addressed the issue of whether
bulk metadata collection implicates the Fourth Amendment, although these
opinions are not, at least generally speaking, available to the general public.173
Chief Judge Pauley III noted in his 2013 decision described infra that “[f]ifteen
different FISC judges have found the metadata collection program lawful a
total of thirty-five times since May 2006.”174 Additionally, in ruling upon
whether bulk telephone metadata is protected within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment, recent FISC decisions have addressed the opposing arguments
raised by Judge Leon in Klayman and by the Second Circuit in Clapper.175
This portion of the article highlights four of these publicly available FISC
decisions, each of which analyzed the Fourth Amendment in the context of the
U.S. government’s ability to collect bulk telephone metadata.
1. In re Application (August 2013 Opinion)
The genesis of In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted],176
can be traced to an application submitted by the FBI on July 18, 2013 to the
171. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 824.
172. Id.
173. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1) (2015) (authorizing FISC judges to issue ex parte orders
approving the release of tangible things).
174. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 756.
175. In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *9 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
176. Id. at *1.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

30

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV:3

FISC for an order pursuant to 50 U.S.C § 1861, which required the ongoing
daily production to the NSA of certain telephone metadata.177 The FISC “held
an extensive hearing to receive testimony and evidence on this matter,” which
was conducted ex parte under security procedures mandated by law;178 the
court approved the application on July 19, 2013.179 As noted by the
Washington Post, the August 2013 opinion “is the first to be released [to the
general public] that addresses the constitutionality of the NSA’s ‘bulk records’
collection of phone data,” [and was] an attempt by the U.S. government to
“address growing criticism about [its] broad surveillance [program] . . . .”180
During its review of the government’s FISA application, the FISC
analyzed whether the Fourth Amendment “imposed any impediment” to the
government’s proposal to collect bulk telephone metadata.181 Judge Eagan,
writing on behalf of the FISC, noted that the government’s collection of
telephone service provider metadata is “squarely controlled” by Smith and its
progeny.182 According to the FISC Judge, “[t]he Supreme Court in Smith
recognized that telephone companies maintain call detail records in the normal
course of business for a variety of purposes”183 and “‘[t]elephone users . . .
typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone
company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information;
and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety
of legitimate business purposes.’”184 Thus, “once a person has transmitted this
information to a third party (in this case, a telephone company), the person ‘has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in [the] information,’”185 and when the

177. Id.
178. Id.; see 50 U.S.C § 1803 (2015) (mandating that FISC proceedings “be maintained under
security measures established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and
the Director of National Intelligence”); see also Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge,
to Patrick J. Leahy, Commissioner, Senate Judiciary Committee (July 29, 2013), http://www.lea
hy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Honorable%20Patrick%20J%20Leahy.pdf (describing some of the
security measures implemented by the FISC).
179. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *1.
180. Ellen Nakashima, FISA Court Releases Opinion Upholding NSA Phone Program,
WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fisacourt-releases-opinion-upholding-nsa-phone-program/2013/09/17/66660718-1fd3-11e3-b7d1-715
3ad47b549_story.html.
181. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *1.
182. Id. at *2; see generally Benjamin Wittes & Jane Chong, Congress Has No Clothes: A
Quick and Dirty Summary of the New FISC Opinion, LAWFARE (Sept. 17, 2013, 9:03 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/congress-has-no-clothes-quick-and-dirty-summary-new-fiscopinion (noting that Judge Eagan put forth a “strong” legal opinion).
183. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *2 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742
(1979)).
184. Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743).
185. Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743).
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government obtains this telephone metadata from the telephone company, it is
not conducting a “search,” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.186
Judge Eagan considered the factual distinctions between Smith and more
recent requests by the U.S. government to collect telephone metadata in
bulk.187 She recognized that Smith focused on the government’s ability to
obtain “the telephone company’s metadata of one person suspected of a crime”
and the current case focused on the government’s request for the “daily
production of certain telephony metadata in bulk belonging to companies
without specifying the particular number of an individual.”188 Judge Eagan
cited a similar (but redacted) legal analysis that the FISC had previously
undertaken, and noted that “the application of the Fourth Amendment depends
on the government’s intruding into some individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy [and] Fourth Amendment rights are personal and individual.”189 Thus,
“[s]o long as no individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in meta
data, the large number of persons whose communications will be subjected to
the . . . surveillance is irrelevant to the issue of whether a Fourth Amendment
search or seizure will occur.”190
Judge Eagan reinforced her legal analysis by stating, “where one individual
does not have a Fourth Amendment interest, grouping together a large number
of similarly-situated individuals cannot result in a Fourth Amendment interest
springing into existence ex nihilo.”191 In other words, “Judge Eagan concludes
that if metadata does not implicate an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy
interest in his telephony metadata, neither does the bulk collection of metadata
about numerous persons.”192
In concluding her opinion, Judge Eagan stated that because the U.S.
government’s application only concerns the production of telephony metadata
that was collected and retained by a telecommunications provider – and not the
contents of communications – the Smith decision “compels the conclusion that
there is no Fourth Amendment impediment to the collection.”193 According to
the Judge, “this Court finds that the volume of records being acquired does not

186. Id. (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 746); see generally Orin S. Kerr, My (Mostly Critical)
Thoughts on the August 2013 FISC Opinion on Section 215, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 17,
2013, 7:39 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/09/17/thoughts-august-2013-fisc-opinion-section-215/
(briefly noting support for Judge Eagan’s Fourth Amendment analysis).
187. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *2–3.
188. Id. at *2.
189. Id.
190. Id. See also White Paper, supra note 23, at 20 (addressing whether the volume of records
impacts the Fourth Amendment analysis regarding bulk telephone metadata).
191. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *2.
192. Wittes & Chong, supra note 182.
193. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *3.
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alter this conclusion” and “there is no legal basis for this Court to find
otherwise.”194
2. In re Application (October 2013 Opinion)
On October 11, 2013, Judge McLaughlin of the FISC granted the FBI’s
application to renew the order discussed in the aforementioned August 2014
FISC ruling.195 She issued a memorandum that both adopted Judge Eagan’s
conclusions regarding the Fourth Amendment and provided additional
reasoning that supported her argument that the production of bulk telephone
metadata does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.196 Judge McLaughlin
began her Fourth Amendment analysis by noting that she “agrees with Judge
Eagan that, under [Smith], the production of call detail records in this matter
does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.”197 Judge
McLaughlin found that the Supreme Court “stressed” in Smith that the U.S.
government’s use of a pen register to record the numbers dialed from the
defendant’s home telephone did not constitute a “search” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment because “the information acquired did not include
the contents of any communication and that the information was acquired by
the government from the telephone company, to which the defendant had
voluntarily disclosed it for the purpose of completing his calls.”198
According to the New York Times, “Judge Eagan’s opinion,” discussed
infra “has been criticized, in part, because she made no mention of a landmark
privacy case decided by the Supreme Court in 2012,”199 and, in contrast Judge
McLaughlin specifically addressed the Jones decision and found that it “does
not point to a different result here.”200 More specifically, Judge McLaughlin
reiterated the holding in Jones and stated the majority opinion of the Court
“declined to decide whether use of the GPS device, without the physical
intrusion, impinged upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.”201 Judge
McLaughlin stated that although “[f]ive Justices in Jones signed or joined
concurring opinions suggesting that the precise, pervasive monitoring by the
government of a person’s location could trigger Fourth Amendment protection

194. Id.
195. In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[REDACTED], No. BR 13-158, at *1–2 (FISA Ct. October 11, 2013), available at www.aclu.
org/files/assets/2013.10.11_fisa_court_memorandum.pdf. See generally Charlie Savage, N.S.A.
Plan to Log Calls Is Renewed by Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/20
13/10/19/us/nsa-plan-to-log-calls-is-renewed-by-court.html.
196. In re Application, No. BR 13-158, at *4–5.
197. Id. at *4.
198. Id.
199. Savage, supra note 195.
200. In re Application, No. BR 13-158, at *4.
201. Id.
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even without any physical intrusion[,]” the issue presented for her review (i.e.,
the collection of bulk telephone metadata) does not involve such monitoring,
and, “[l]ike Smith, this case concerns the acquisition of non-content metadata
other than location information.”202
She also addressed Judge Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones, which
provided that “it ‘may be necessary’ for the Supreme Court to ‘reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,’ which [the Associate
Supreme Court Justice] described as ‘ill suited to the digital age.’”203 Judge
McLaughlin emphasized in her FISC opinion, however, that the Jones case did
not actually re-examine the relevancy of the third party doctrine,204 and that
“Smith remains controlling with respect to the acquisition by the government
from service providers of non-content telephony metadata.”205
3. In re Application (March 2014 Opinion)
On January 3, 2014, the FISC issued an order requiring telecommunication
entities to produce to the NSA, in bulk and on an ongoing basis, certain
metadata within their possession.206 On January 22, 2014, a recipient of the
production order filed a petition with the FISC requesting the court “to vacate,
modify, or reaffirm” said order in light of the conclusions reached by Judge
Leon in Klayman.207 According to one commentator, “[t]he petition was the
first time a telephone company had directly challenged an order to hand over
phone records in bulk.”208 In response, the U.S. government filed a reply brief
to the FISC that noted that the FISC, in issuing its original production order,
did in fact consider Klayman¸ as well as the FISC’s holdings in its August

202. Id. at *5. See also Allison Grande, FISA Judge Renews NSA Spying, Citing Congress’
Support, LAW360 (Oct. 21, 2013, 4:33 PM) (noting that Judge McLaughlin “rejected the
argument” that the NSA’s telephone metadata collection program “violates the Fourth
Amendment, finding that the production of metadata on domestic phone calls does not constitute
a ‘search’ because it does not include the contents of conversations and the data is collected
directly from a telephone company to which consumers voluntarily disclose their information”).
203. In re Application, No. BR 13-158, at *5 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct., 945,
957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
204. Id. (“The Supreme Court may some day revisit the third-party disclosure principle in the
context of twenty-first century communications technology, but that day has not arrived.”).
205. Id. at *5–6.
206. In re Application of F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
No. BR 14-01, *1 (FISA Ct. March 20, 2014), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/11489
29/opinion-and-order-in-case.pdf.
207. Id. at *1–2. In accordance with FISA, the recipient of a FISC production order is
permitted to “challenge the legality of that order” with the FISC. Id. at *1 (citing 50 U.S.C. §
1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (2015); FISC Rule 33(a) (2010)).
208. Julian Hattem, Phone Company Fought NSA — and Lost, THE HILL (April 25, 2014, 6:19
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/204438-phone-company-challenged-nsa-program-lost.
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2013 and October 2013 decisions, respectively.209 Judge Collyer, writing on
behalf of the FISC, affirmed the production order and noted that it “remains in
full force and effect until it expires by its own terms on March 28, 2014,”210
and discussed at length whether the Fourth Amendment impacts the U.S.
government’s ability to collect telephone metadata in bulk.211 Judge Collyer’s
legal analysis can be separated into three sections: (a) a brief discussion on the
Fourth Amendment and Smith; (b) a review of Judge Leon’s opinion in
Klayman and an examination on the continuing relevance of Smith; and (c) an
analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones.212 In turn, each of these
issues will be described separately.
a. Judge Collyer’s Analysis of the Fourth Amendment and Smith
Prior to engaging in her Fourth Amendment analysis, Judge Collyer noted
that Judge Leon’s reasoning in Klayman was “unpersuasive” and “provides no
basis for vacating or muddying” the FISC’s previously issued production
order.213 Next, Judge Collyer reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith
that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties”214 and stated that “[o]ther courts have
relied on Smith in concluding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
‘trap and trace’ devices, which function like pen registers but record the
originating numbers of incoming calls, or to information such as the date, time,
and duration of calls.”215 Judge Collyer found that the telephone metadata
information that petitioner provides the NSA in accordance with the
production order is “indistinguishable in nature from the information at issue in
Smith and its progeny,”216 and “two judges of this [FISC] . . . and two federal

209. In re Application, No. BR 14-01, at *3–6.
210. Id. at *2.
211. Id. at *9–30.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *9. For opposing viewpoints discussing Judge Collyer’s opinion, compare Stewart
Baker, Unpersuasive Judicial Punctuation, WASH. POST, April 27, 2014, https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/27/unpersuasive-judicial-punctuation/ with
Randy Barnett, Another Secret FISA Opinion Disclosed, and a Question for Stewart Baker,
WASH. POST (April 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/20
14/04/28/another-secret-fisa-opinion-disclosed-and-a-question-for-stewart-baker/.
214. In re Application, No. BR 14-01, at *10. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
743–44 (1979).
215. Id. at *10–11 (citing United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2009); United
States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v.
Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990)).
216. In re Application, No. BR 14-01 at *11 (The information being provided to the NSA
includes dialed and incoming telephone numbers and other numbers pertaining to the placing or
routing of calls, the date, time, and duration of calls; however, it does not include the “contents”).
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district courts have recently concluded that Smith is controlling with respect to
the bulk telephony metadata produced to NSA.”217
b. Judge Collyer’s Analysis of Klayman and the Relevance of Smith
Thereafter, Judge Collyer addressed the following four arguments raised
by Judge Leon in Klayman wherein he concluded that Smith does not provide
adequate guidance in determining whether there is a constitutionally protected
expectation of privacy in telephone metadata provided to telecommunication
entities.218 First, Judge Leon asserted that the U.S. government’s telephone
metadata collection activity in Smith was limited in duration to approximately
two weeks, and the NSA program, in contrast, involves the U.S. government
collecting and maintaining five-year’s worth of data and it might continue this
activity “forever.”219
Second, Judge Leon argued that, “the relationship between the police and
the phone company in Smith is nothing compared to the relationship that has
apparently evolved over the last seven years between the Government and the
telecom companies,”220 and citizens most likely do not expect that
telecommunication companies should engage with the NSA in a manner that
“is effectively a joint intelligence-gathering operation.”221 Third, Judge Leon
argued that technological advancements permit the U.S. government to collect
and retain information through means that could not have been “conceived in
1979” and to do so in a manner that evades the “ordinary checks that constrain
abusive law enforcement practices.”222 Fourth, Judge Leon found, “most
importantly,” that “the nature and quantity” of information within telephony
metadata “is much greater” today than it was at the time of Smith,223 and

217. Id. at *11–12 (citing ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, WL 6079518, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013); In
re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 13-158 at *5–6.; In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL
5741573, at *4–5 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013)). See also Press Release, Director of National
Intelligence, DOJ and the ODNI Announce the Publication of Additional FISC Filings, Opinions
and Orders Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the FISA (April 25, 2014),
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/198-press-releases-2014/1058-doj-andthe-odni-announce-the-publication-of-additional-fisc-filings,-opinions-and-orders-regarding-col
lection-under-section-501-of-the-fisa (discussing Judge Collyer’s application of Smith in the bulk
telephone metadata context) [hereinafter, “Press Release”].
218. In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *12–14.
219. Id. at *12–13 (quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2013)).
220. Id. (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32) (emphasis in original).
221. Id. at *5 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33).
222. Id. at *13–14 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33).
223. Id. at *14 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 34).
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today’s metadata can “reveal an entire mosaic-a vibrant and constantly
updating picture of the person’s life.”224
After putting forth these arguments, Judge Collyer noted that the FISC
“respectfully disagrees with Judge Leon’s reasons for deviating from
Smith.”225 In the words of one commentator, Judge Collyer addressed Judge
Leon’s decision in Klayman and “made short work of it, laying out and
rejecting each of Judge Leon’s reasons for treating the program as a [F]ourth
[A]mendment violation.”226 Specifically, Judge Collyer found that Judge
Leon’s arguments “focused largely on what happens (and what could happen)
to the telephony metadata after it has been acquired by NSA,”227 and held that
this focus is misplaced because the third-party principle makes clear that an
individual “has ‘no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties’ . . . regardless of the disclosing person’s
assumptions or expectations with respect to what will be done with the
information following its disclosure.”228
The individual disclosing the information “assumes the risk of further
disclosure by the third party”229 and the Court has ruled that it is
“unreasonable” for him “to expect his . . . records to remain private.”230 Judge
Collyer relied upon this line of reasoning to conclude the following:
“If a person who voluntarily discloses information can have no reasonable
expectation concerning limits on how the recipient will use or handle the
information, it necessarily follows that he or she also can harbor no such
expectation with respect to how the Government will use or handle the
information after it has been divulged by the recipient. Smith itself makes clear
that once a person has voluntarily conveyed dialing information to the
telephone company, he forfeits his right to privacy in the information,
regardless of how it might be later used by the recipient or the Government.
Accordingly, Judge Leon’s concerns regarding NSA’s retention and analysis of
the call detail records are irrelevant in determining whether a Fourth
231
Amendment search has occurred.”

224. In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *14 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d
at 36).
225. Id. at *14.
226. Baker, supra note 213.
227. In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01, at *14.
228. Id. at *15 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–744 (1979)).
229. Id. (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 744).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 17 (internal citations omitted); see generally Charlie Savage, Surveillance Court
Rules That N.S.A. Can Resume Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2015 (briefly noting
that Judge Collyer “rejected Judge Leon’s reasoning” in Klayman and “permitted the [telephone
metadata collection] program to keep going”).
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Next, Judge Collyer found that “[f]or the same reason, Judge Leon’s
assertions regarding citizens’ expectations with respect to the ‘relationship . . .
between the Government and the telecom companies,’ also provide no basis
for departing from Smith.”232 According to Judge Collyer, Smith and other
judicial precedent on the third party doctrine provides that “any such
expectations or assumptions on the part of telephone users who have disclosed
their dialing information to the phone company have no bearing on the
question whether a search has occurred.”233
Further, Judge Collyer dismissed Judge Leon’s reasoning that the “nature
and quantity” of telephone metadata today serves as a basis for deviating from
Smith.234 Here, Judge Collyer focused on the incongruity within Judge Leon’s
argument wherein he asserts that telephone’s today, unlike at the time of Smith,
serve as “‘multi-purpose devices’ that can be used to access Internet content,
and as maps, music players, cameras, text messaging devices,”235 but
simultaneously acknowledges that the type of information acquired by the U.S.
government here is limited in scope, such as to the telephone numbers dialed,
the length of the call, and the date and time of the call.236 Therefore, according
to Judge Collyer, none of the additional functions equipped on today’s phones
generate information that the U.S. government is collecting as part of the
FISC’s production order, and such changes in telephone technology are
“irrelevant” to the Fourth Amendment analysis.237
Thereafter, Judge Collyer indicated that Judge Leon’s “repeated
emphasi[s] [on] the total quantity of telephony metadata obtained and retained
by NSA” was “misplaced under settled Supreme Court precedent.”238
According to the FISC Judge, given that Fourth Amendment rights are
“personal rights” that “may not be vicariously asserted,” the “aggregate scope
of the collection and the overall size of NSA’s database are immaterial in
assessing whether any person’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been

232. Id. (quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32–33 (D.D.C. 2013)).
233. In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01, at *18 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 744); see
Press Release, supra note 217 (noting that Judge Collyer found that Judge Leon’s opinion in
Klayman “was unpersuasive [and] provided no basis for vacating the production order,” and “that
[Smith] is the controlling precedent”).
234. Id. at *18.
235. Id. at *18–19 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 34, 36).
236. Id. at *18.
237. Id. at *19; see Kerr, supra note 111 (arguing that changes in cell phone technology does
not alter the Fourth Amendment analysis in the context described herein because the information
the U.S. government collects as part of the telephone metadata program is substantially similar to
the types of information collected in Smith).
238. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01, at *19–20.
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violated. . . . .”239 “The pertinent question,” according to Judge Collyer, is
“whether a particular user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
telephony metadata associated with his or her own calls”240 and in determining
whether a search has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
“it is irrelevant that other users’ information is also being collected and that the
aggregate amount acquired is very large.”241
According to Judge Collyer, “time and technology” have not affected
Supreme Court precedent, and the government’s collection program under
review is less intrusive then the one the government reviewed in Miller, which
was the principal case relied upon in Smith.242 In Miller, the Supreme Court
held that a bank customer did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
bank records that provided to police investigators pursuant to a subpoena and
included checks, deposit slips, monthly statements and financial statements for
a span of over three months.243 The Court found that the bank records
“contain[ed] only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed
to their employees in the ordinary course of business”244 and that “[t]he
depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information
will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”245 According to Judge
Collyer, “[i]t is far from clear to this Court that even years’ worth of noncontent call detail records would reveal more of the details about a telephone
user’s personal life than several months’ worth of the same person’s bank
records.”246
“[B]ank records,” according to the Judge, “are likely to provide the
Government directly with detailed information about a customer’s personal
life,”247 such as the identities of the individuals with whom the customer has
had financial relationships, the sources of his personal income, the amounts
and detailed types of his personal expenses, the charities and political
organizations he supports through financial donations – all of which is

239. Id. at *20 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978); Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)); see also White Paper, supra note 23, at 20 (noting that the volume of
records collected by the U.S. government does not alter its Fourth Amendment analysis).
240. In re Application of the F.B.I, No. BR 14-01, at *20.
241. Id. See Charlie Savage, Phone Company Bid to Keep Data From N.S.A. Is Rejected,
N.Y. TIMES (April 25, 2014) (“Judge Collyer said the Supreme Court precedent was still valid
and that the bulk nature of the collection was irrelevant because what mattered was each
individual caller’s expectation of privacy.”).
242. In re Application of the F.B.I, No. BR 14-01, at *21, 23.
243. Id. at *21 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 448 (1976)); see generally
Kerr, supra note 52, at 578–79 (discussing Miller and the third party doctrine).
244. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *21 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 442).
245. Id. at *21 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 433).
246. Id.
247. Id. (emphasis in original).
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information “that call detail records simply do not, by themselves, provide.”248
Separately, Judge Collyer reasoned that the Miller decision, which was
published in 1976, “substantially undermines Judge Leon's conclusion that
Smith does not apply to the NSA telephony metadata program because the
metadata from each person’s phone reveals so much about a person ‘that could
not have been gleaned from a data collection in 1979,’ when Smith was
decided.”249 The Judge found that “[m]any more personal details” could be
uncovered from bank records such as the ones approved by the Miller Court
without raising expectation of privacy concerns.250
c. Judge Collyer’s Analysis of Jones
After addressing the aforementioned arguments raised by Judge Leon in
Klayman, Judge Collyer turned to the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s
decision in Jones altered whether there is a constitutionally protected
expectation of privacy in telephone metadata.251 She noted that the Supreme
Court’s holding therein rested on the fact that the U.S. government obtained
the information in question through a physical intrusion on the defendant’s
vehicle, which the Court viewed as a constitutionally-protected area.252 Judge
Collyer emphasized that the Supreme Court cited Smith “only in passing” in
the Jones case.253
She also noted that although there are two concurring opinions in Jones
that address privacy issues, “they suggest distinct analytical approaches and
thus can hardly be read as having adopted a single, coherent principle or
methodology for lower courts to apply.”254 First, with regard to Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, the Associate Justice’s opinion focused on
whether police conduct collected so much personal information on an
individual that it enabled law enforcement to learn about a person’s private
affairs at any given time.255 Second, Justice Alito’s opinion framed the issue as
whether the police investigation at issue exceeded society’s expectations for
how law enforcement personnel would in fact investigate a particular crime.256
Judge Collyer emphasized that Justice Alito’s concurrence, to which three

248. Id. at *21–22.
249. Id.
250. Id. at *22; but see Barnett, supra note 213 (criticizing the analogy to bank records, as
described in Miller, in the telephone metadata context).
251. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *24.
252. Id. at *25 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 953 (2012)).
253. Id. at. *26 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950).
254. Id. at *26–27.
255. Id. at *27 (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 328 (Dec. 2012)).
256. Id. (citing Kerr, supra note 255, at 328).
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other Justices joined, does not even mention Smith.257 Also, she stated the
distinct approaches taken in the concurring opinions “undercut Judge Leon’s
suggestion that the five concurring Justices in Jones can be viewed as a de
facto majority on the issue.”258
Judge Collyer reiterated that although Justice Sotomayor stated in her
concurrence “that ‘it may be necessary to reconsider” the third-party disclosure
principle applied in Smith and Miller, which she described as ‘ill suited to the
digital age,’ she expressly stated that it was unnecessary for the Court to
undertake such a reexamination in Jones.”259 Thus, “[w]hile the concurring
opinions in Jones may signal that some or even most of the Justices are ready
to revisit certain settled Fourth Amendment principles, the decision in Jones
itself breaks no new ground concerning the third-party disclosure doctrine
generally or Smith specifically.”260
4. In re Application (June 2015 Opinion)
In June of 2015, Judge Mosman, writing on behalf of the FISC, addressed
whether to approve an application by the FBI requiring the production of
certain telephone metadata in light of the recently-enacted USA FREEDOM
Act.261 Judge Mosman found that the FISC was authorized to approve such
requests, at least for an interim period of 180-days until certain provisions
within the USA FREEDOM Act that ended the government’s bulk collection
of telephone metadata went into effect.262 According to one commentator, the
180-day transition period was “baked into” the law “to allow the NSA time to
switch over to a more limited and targeted surveillance regime.”263
Prior to reviewing whether the bulk telephone metadata collection program
was consistent with the Fourth Amendment, Judge Mosman analyzed the
underlying statutory authority for the U.S. government to request and collect
257. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *27–28.
258. Id. at *27 (citing Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013)); United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
259. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *28 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
260. Id. at *30. Judge Collyer also stated, “[t]he concurring opinions notwithstanding, Jones
simply cannot be read as inviting the lower courts to rewrite Fourth Amendment law in this area.”
Id.
261. In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
No. BR 15-75, at *1 (FISC Ct. June 29, 2015) (internal citations omitted).
262. Id.
263. Dustin Volz, Court Revives Defunct NSA Mass Surveillance Program, Nat’l J. (June 30,
2015), http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/24869/court-revives-defunct-nsa-mass-surveillance-pro
gram; see also Statement by the ODNI on Retention of Data Collected Under Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act, IC on the Rec. (July 27, 2015) (discussing how the U.S. government will
retain and access telephone metadata previously collected in accordance with Section 215)¸
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/125179645313/statement-by-the-odni-on-retention-of-data.
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the bulk telephone metadata in question.264 Specifically Judge Mosman
addressed the conclusion reached by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Clapper that section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT does not permit the FISC
to approve applications permitting the U.S. government to collect vast amounts
of telephone data.265 Specifically, Judge Mosman found that “Second Circuit
rulings are not binding on the FISC,”266 the FISC “disagrees with the [Second
Circuit’s] analysis,”267 and “[t]o a considerable extent, the Second Circuit’s
analysis rests on mischaracterizations of how [the telephone metadata
collection] program works. . . ”268 The Judge’s opinion led one commentator to
claim that there was a “cat fight between the FISA court and the 2nd Circuit
Court of Appeals.”269
In turning to his Fourth Amendment analysis, Judge Mosman noted that
“the FISC has repeatedly concluded on numerous occasions that NSA’s
acquisition of call detail records under the terms set forth in the government’s
application . . . comports with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.”270
He then addressed the argument raised by amici that the “differences between
the present circumstances and Smith in nature and scope are so stark as to
make Smith inapposite,”271 and responded by holding that the nature of the
information government receives pursuant to the FISC’s order, which does not
include any communications content, is “indistinguishable from the
information at issue in Smith and its progeny.”272 Judge Mosman found, “[a]s
in Smith, this information is voluntarily conveyed to a telecommunications
provider when a person places a call, and the provider stores and uses the
information for billing and other purposes.”273
The FISC Judge addressed that fact that, unlike in Smith, the government
was using the FISC’s order to collect “trunk identifiers,” “International Mobile
Subscriber Identity” numbers, “International Mobile station Equipment
Identity” numbers and telephone calling card numbers, and ruled that such
information is still the same type of dialing, signaling, and routing information
that that does not include communications contents and that telephone users
provide to telecommunication entities in order to complete routine calls and

264. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 15-75, at *8–18.
265. Id. at *11
266. Id. at *14–15.
267. Id. at *15.
268. Id. at *16.
269. Benjamin Wittes, Rational Security, the “War on the War on Terror” Edition, LAWFARE
(July 2, 2015, 10:03 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/rational-security-war-war-terror-edition.
270. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 15-75, at *12.
271. Id. at *18.
272. Id.
273. Id. at *20.
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which is retained for business purposes.274 Judge Mosman found that users of
such telecommunications services simply have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in this information.275
Without going into more detail, Judge Mosman dismissed other arguments
raised by the Movants related to the “nature of the produced call detail
records” on the grounds that Judge Collyer “previously considered and
rejected” these arguments.276 Judge Mosman also cited Judge Collyer’s
opinion as he rejected the attempt “to distinguish this case [from Smith] based
on the government’s storage and use of the data post-acquisition” because the
“third-party disclosure principle applies regardless of the disclosing person’s
assumptions or expectations with respect to what will be done with the
information following its disclosure.”277 Next, Judge Mosman again relied on
Judge Collyer’s previous opinion to summarily reject (without more
explanation) the Movants’ arguments that the FISC should find a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the metadata provided to telecommunications entities
because of “expectations based on their contractual relationships with
telecommunications providers, the fact that there are more providers to choose
from than there were in 1979, and . . . that the relationship between the
government and the providers is different.”278
Thereafter, Judge Mosman stated that the argument that “the scope of the
collection justifies departing from Smith” was “equally unavailing.”279
Specifically, Judge Mosman cited the principle that “Fourth Amendment rights
‘are personal in nature”’280 to reason that the government’s acquisition of “data
about many people is immaterial in assessing whether any particular person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated such that a search under
the Fourth Amendment has occurred.281 “To the extent the quantity of
metadata is relevant at all, it can only be the quantity of metadata that pertains
to a particular person,” according to the Judge.282

274. Id.
275. Id. See generally Lauren Walker, NSA to Keep Collecting Your Telephone Metadata for
6 More Months, Court Rules, NEWSWEEK (June 30, 2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/
nsa-keep-collecting-your-telephone-metadata-6-more-months-court-rules-348847.
276. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 15-75, at *20.
277. Id. at *20–21.
278. Id. at *21 (citing In re Application of the F.B.I., No. 14-01, at *16, *17–18); see
generally Savage, supra note 195.
279. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 15-75, at *22.
280. Id.
281. Id. (citing In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *20).
282. Id. at *22 (citing In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *20–21); see also
White Paper, supra note 23, at 20 (noting that the volume of records collected by the U.S.
government does not alter its Fourth Amendment analysis).
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In a separate portion of his analysis, Judge Mosman reiterated the
Movants’ argument “that a series of statutes enacted after Smith respecting the
disclosure by telephone companies of information about their customers’ calls
supports the conclusion that Movants have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the metadata in question” and found that this argument “lacks merit.”283
According to the FISC Judge, Congress may provide safeguards to personal
information and regulate how law enforcement personnel access and retain
such data.284 However, according to the Judge, this type of legal framework is
statutory (and not constitutional) in nature, and thus does not impact the Fourth
Amendment’s search and seizure framework.285 The Judge also noted that the
actual statutes cited by movants “fail” to even support their Fourth Amendment
argument.286
Next, Judge Mosman rejected the Movants’ argument that the FISC should
interpret certain case law to find the third-party disclosure inapplicable to the
current case, and ruled that “these cases do not reduce the binding authority of
Smith”287 and that the FISC previously addressed and distinguished several of
the cases raised by the Movants.288 Next, and just as hastily, the Judge rejected
the movants argument related to the U.S government’s collection of cell-site
and GPS location information on the ground that “no such information is
involved in this case.”289
Last, Judge Mosman concluded his Fourth Amendment legal analysis by
addressing the Movant’s argument that the FISC “should find that they have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in call detail records based on the concurring
opinions in [Jones].”290 The Judge noted that two FISC judges – Judge Collyer
and Judge McLaughlin – previously heard similar arguments and rejected them
for lack of merit, respectively, and he “agrees with their analysis.”291
Specifically, Judge Mosman quoted Judge Collyer’s opinion in support of the
following proposition: “[w]hile the concurring opinions in Jones may signal
that some or even most of the Justices are ready to revisit certain settled Fourth
283. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 15-75, at *22–23.
284. Id. at *23.
285. Id. See United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733,737 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting claim that
enhanced protections for bank records in Right to Financial Privacy Act impact expectations of
privacy within the context of the Fourth Amendment).
286. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 15-75, at *23.
287. Id.
288. Id. (citing In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01, at *16, *18).
289. Id. at *24. Smith v. Obama, 24 F.Supp. 3d 1005, 1008–09 (D. Idaho 2014) (noting that
the “subject lurking in the shadows” was the “possibility that the NSA is tracking the location of
calls”). However, the Chief Judge concluded that “[w]hile there is speculation that the NSA is
tracking location, there is no evidence of that, and the agency denies it” and “the Court will not
assume that the NSA’s privacy intrusions include location tracking.” Id. at 1009.
290. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 15-75, at *24.
291. Id.
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Amendment principles, the decision in Jones itself breaks no new ground
concerning the third-party disclosure doctrine generally or Smith specifically . .
. ”292 Thus, Judge Mosman found that because Smith was controlling and the
U.S. government’s collection of telephone metadata in accordance with
Section 215 did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.293
V. CONCLUSION
The aforementioned cases represent the most recent legal opinions
discussing whether the Fourth Amendment impacts the U.S. government’s
ability to collect and retain telephone metadata in bulk. Given the recent
statutory amendments enumerated in the USA FREEDOM ACT294 and the
probability that without additional congressional action the U.S. government
may no longer use Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT295 to collect
telephone metadata in bulk, the cases discussed herein may become moot and
dismissed in the near future. Thus, this case law may provide the most relevant
precedent for years to come on the issue of whether individuals have a
constitutionality protected reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone
metadata.
In discussing this issue, the cases described in Part IV of this article
primarily focus on whether Smith’s holding that a telephone user does not have
an expectation of privacy in a limited amount of telephone metadata provided
to a telephone company is applicable to an exponentially greater volume of the
same information. As noted above, Judge Leon would seem to answer that
question in the negative296, as would Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor.297
According to their opinions described supra, such voluminous amounts of
telephone metadata reveals deeply personal information and, through the last
several years, society has come to expect that such private and personal
information would not be readily available to the U.S. government in a manner
outside the scope and restrictions enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.298
However, these arguments have been thoroughly rejected by the FISC and
have not fared too well in other Article III courts. For example, courts have
rejected these arguments for the following reasons: an individual should not
292. Id. at *24–25 (quoting In re Application of the F.B.I., No. 14-01, at *30).
293. Id. at *25.
294. Pub. L. No. 114–23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015).
295. See United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 18, 2013); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11–14 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper,
959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Smith v. Obama, 24 F.Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 2014); In
re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
296. See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
297. See Part IV, infra.
298. Id.; Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1.
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reasonably expect that information he provides a third party will remain private
or in confidence of the recipient; the type of information that the U.S.
government collected pursuant to Section 215, non-content-based information,
is substantially similar to the information at issue in Smith, which therefore
should remain controlling; information not protected by the Fourth
Amendment, such as non-content based telephone metadata, does not gain
such protection simply because one aggregates that information large amounts;
and the Constitution does not protect other types of information beyond
telephone metadata that reveals deeply personal information, such as bank
records, and thus it would not be appropriate to extend the Fourth Amendment
to telephone metadata provided to third parties.299
As is clear from the case summary provided herein, the judges addressing
this very difficult constitutional issue put forth valid and respectable arguments
in which one can reasonable and ethically agree or disagree. However, as
noted, this issue may not be resolved by the Supreme Court in the near term,
and it will be lawyers and practitioners that will need to rely on this case law in
developing their own arguments regarding the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment as similar national security programs that are developed in the
future.

299. See United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 18, 2013); Klayman, 957 F. Supp. at 21; ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Smith v. Obama, 24 F.Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 2014); In re Application of the F.B.I. for
an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL
5741573 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
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